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Purpose: The aim of this study was to explore the service and policy structures that impact 
open disclosure (OD) practices in New South Wales (NSW), Australia.
Participants and methods: An explorative study using semi-structured interviews was 
undertaken with 12 individuals closely involved in the implementation of OD in hospitals at 
policy or practice levels within the state of NSW, Australia. Interviews explored the service and 
policy structures surrounding OD and the perceived impact of these on the implementation of 
the OD policy. These data were thematically analyzed to understand the factors facilitating and 
creating barriers to openness after adverse events.
Results: The data identified three key areas in which greater alignment between OD policy 
and the wider service and policy structures may enhance the implementation of OD practice: 
1) alignment between OD and root cause analysis processes, 2) holistic training that links to 
other relevant processes such as communicating bad news, risk management, and professional 
regulation and insurance, and 3) policy clarification regarding the disclosure of incidents that 
result in no or low-level harm.
Conclusion: Evidence from this study indicates that formal OD processes are not routinely 
applied after adverse events in NSW, despite clear guidelines for OD. The reasons for this are 
unclear as the service-level and policy-level phenomena that support or hinder OD are under-
studied. This knowledge is critical to addressing the policy-practice gap. Our paper provides 
insights regarding the influence of current service-level and policy-level phenomena on the 
delivery of OD and how policy clarification may contribute to addressing some of the challenges 
for implementing OD policy. The principles of virtue ethics – specifically, openness and the 
involvement of service users – may contribute to progressing in this area.
Keywords: incident disclosure, adverse events, health policy, hospitals, patient-centered care, 
qualitative research
Introduction
Open disclosure (OD) is “an open discussion with a patient about an incident(s) that 
resulted in harm to that patient while they were receiving health care”.1 The principles 
underpinning OD were established over 25 years ago in the USA and remain constant; 
health care providers should openly and honestly discuss incidents that occur during 
health care that cause harm to patients.2,3 The first OD policy was implemented by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs in the USA in 1995, while the Australian National 
Disclosure Standard was created by a multidisciplinary committee established by 
Standards Australia in 2003. Other English speaking countries gradually implemented 
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OD approaches over the next decade, although sometimes 
using a different approach or terminology such as Being Open 
(and the related arguments for a “duty of candor”) or “honest 
disclosure” (in the UK) and “full disclosure” (in the USA).
Policy makers, clinicians, and patients agree that trans-
parency and honesty after adverse events are beneficial for 
patient care; yet, the implementation of OD in practice has 
been challenging.2 Evidence to date highlights the uncertain-
ties and interpersonal challenges associated with OD practice 
in studies with patients and health professionals.4–7 While 
the ethical arguments for OD are strong, there are many 
stakeholders, and the implementation of OD is impacted by 
their perspectives. Barriers to OD have been identified for 
different stakeholders internationally; specifically, health 
professionals’ fears of litigation or damaged reputation.4 
While several studies have explored health professional and 
patient perspectives of OD and the role of apology laws in 
this context, less is known about the influence of service-
level phenomena and policy governance phenomena, such as 
existing service strategies, and local policies and procedures 
(both formal and informal) used by services to communicate 
about adverse events.8
Policy and practice context
All states and territories in Australia have an OD policy.9 
OD was mandated in 2003 by the Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Health Care when it published the 
National Safety and Quality Health Services Standards (the 
National Standards). Standard 1 “Governance for Safety and 
Quality in Health Care Organisations” of the 2012 National 
Standards included appropriate OD structures and staff train-
ing, essential to enable “patient safety and quality incidents 
[to be] recognized, reported and analysed, and this informa-
tion…used to improve safety systems”.1 This is reflected in 
the second edition of the Standards.10
Additionally, the Australian Open Disclosure Framework 
was developed to guide OD practice in Australian health 
care.11 This framework positions OD as an ethical obligation 
when providing care,  has been endorsed by major practitioner 
bodies regulating practice for nurses, pharmacists, doctors, 
pathologists, and emergency medicine workers, and defines 
the elements of OD.11
The New South Wales (NSW) Health Open Disclosure 
Policy provides mandatory guidelines for OD in NSW health 
facilities.12 The guidelines in this state are comparable to 
those situated in other Australian jurisdictions such as West 
and South Australia.13,14 The NSW Policy requires “health 
services boards, clinical councils, and staff ” to conduct and 
record OD, and chief executives to oversee policy imple-
mentation, making OD a generic responsibility of those in 
the NSW health system. The process is outlined in Box 1.
challenges for practice
Despite the detailed guidance and support relating to the prac-
tice of OD across Australia, recent large-scale data collected 
from patients in NSW showed that formal OD processes only 
took place in 17% of instances in which a patient had an 
adverse event.15 This is despite the state-wide OD training that 
NSW Health implemented in high-level ODs over a decade 
ago.16 Current evidence indicates that a number of service 
structure, policy, and administrative factors, in the context 
of OD, may be barriers to adopting OD processes consistent 
with organizational, state, or national policies.9 The 2008 
evaluation of the national implementation (with data collected 
from hospitals in Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, 
NSW, and Victoria) of the national OD policy noted a number 
of features of the health care system and process impacted 
on the implementation of OD.17 These features included the 
interplay between incident investigation processes and OD 
and professional roles, role boundaries, work routines, and 
communication skills.17 The latter has been the focus of 
interventional approaches aiming to enhance OD practice.18
While evidence from systematic reviews of OD suggests 
that the current policy guidance may not sufficiently address 
the issues arising in OD practice due to the structure and 
processes of health care delivery, data from policy makers 
Box 1 Mandated process for conducting open disclosure in new 
south Wales health facilities
•	 acknowledgement of a patient safety incident to the patient and/
or their support person(s), as soon as possible, generally within 24 
hours of the incident...
•	 Truthful, clear, and timely communication on an ongoing basis as 
required.
•	 Providing an apology to the patient and/or their support person(s) 
as early as possible, including the words “i am sorry” or “we are 
sorry”.
•	 Providing care and support to patients and/or their support 
person(s) which is responsive to their needs and expectations, for 
as long as is required.
•	 Providing support to those providing health care which is 
responsive to their needs and expectations.
•	 an integrated approach to improving patient safety, in which open 
disclosure is linked with clinical and corporate governance, incident 
reporting, risk management, complaints management, and quality 
improvement policies and processes…
•	 Multidisciplinary involvement…
•	 compliance with legal requirements for privacy and 
confidentiality…
Notes: Data from Finlay et al.9
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and health service managers regarding the barriers to OD 
from the policy and service delivery levels are lacking.5,6,19 
To address this gap, individual interviews were undertaken 
with key informants involved in policy development and 
health service delivery in the state of NSW, Australia. The 
interviews were designed to explore the depth of knowledge 
of the OD policy, their experience of the policy and current 
practice, and the service structure and policy barriers per-
ceived as impeding effective policy implementation in NSW.
Participants and methods
Semi-structured interviews with health service managers 
and policy makers who had responsibility for and an interest 
in OD were undertaken between June and December 2015 
as part of a larger study of patients’ experiences of adverse 
events and OD in NSW hospitals. The results of the patients’ 
experiences of adverse events study are discussed elsewhere 
(references removed for blinding). The data in this paper 
contextualize the policy by providing an understanding of 
the broader clinical, administrative, and policy context sur-
rounding adverse events. Given consistent evidence of the 
diverse meanings given to the term “open disclosure” and 
the variation in practice, interviewees were first asked about 
their experience and understanding of OD and that of their 
colleagues. In the second part of the interview, they were 
asked about their perceptions of the service and policy influ-
ences, such as existing service strategies, and local policies 
and procedures (both formal and informal) used by services 
to communicate about adverse events on practice.
ethics and research governance approval
The study received ethics approval from the NSW Population 
and Health Services Research Ethics Committee. Research 
governance approval was also given for interviews conducted 
in NSW Health sites.
sample
Key informants were sought who had particular knowledge 
and understanding of the operationalization of OD at a range of 
levels in the health sector, from the clinical frontline to medical 
defense. Key informants provided insights on the nature of 
the challenges in implementing OD in terms of the structure 
and process of health care, and to provide recommendations 
relating to these challenges. A purposive sample of health 
service managers involved in policy development and service 
delivery from local health districts covering urban, regional, 
and remote areas, the health department, and medical defense 
organizations were invited to participate as key informants. 
Potential participants were identified by the project reference 
group involving researchers, policy makers, and clinicians with 
an expertise in adverse event management. They identified the 
health manager positions and roles which would be engaged in 
OD in hospitals across NSW (as detailed in Table 1), and were 
then invited to take part via direct email from the research team 
to avoid coercion. Key informants were purposively sampled 
to ensure that perspectives were captured from a range of 
organizations and roles relating to the implementation of OD. 
All participants were at a senior level and had been in their 
current roles for >12 months. Study information sheets and 
a consent form were included in the invitation email. Table 1 
shows the basic role descriptions of interview respondents.
A total of 12 interviews were conducted between June 
and December 2015. Eight respondents were interviewed who 
had direct responsibilities for addressing adverse events as 
clinician managers or as health service managers support-
ing clinicians during the OD process. The remaining four 
respondents worked in government policy roles or in medical 
defense organizations, which supported health professionals 
involved in adverse events.
interview schedule
Semi-structured interviews provide an in-depth understand-
ing of respondent experiences with the capacity to follow-up 
Table 1 Responder roles and organization (c: hospital based; P: 
policy or legal organization)
Respondent role/organization Identifier
nurse manager
Medical defense
Medical defense
Clinical governance officer
Patient safety officer
clinical governance director
government legal advisor
government policy advisor
Patient safety officer
Director of nursing
clinical governance director
clinical governance director
c1
P1
P2
c2
c3
c4
P3
P4
c5
c6
c7
c8
Box 2 Definition of the national open disclosure policy
“Open disclosure is:
•	 a patient and consumer right;
•	 a core professional requirement and institutional obligation;
•	 a normal part of an episode of care should the unexpected occur, 
and a critical element of clinical communications;
•	 an attribute of high-quality health service organizations and 
important part of health care quality improvement”.
Notes: Data from McDonnell and guenther.8
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interesting lines of enquiry and to clarify unclear responses. 
An interview schedule focusing on practices and policy con-
text relating to adverse events including OD was developed. 
The research advisory committee reviewed the questions 
for content validity. Questions differed slightly between 
respondents involved in clinical care and those working at a 
policy or administrative level. Irrelevant questions relating 
to either clinical care or policy were removed as needed. 
All respondents in this study were working in NSW Health 
and were asked specifically about OD experiences and the 
operationalization of OD in this context.
Initial questions to the respondents covered their role 
and responsibilities for adverse events. Respondents in 
 clinical settings provided an example of an adverse event 
and described how it was managed, who was involved, and 
what information was collected. Respondents from policy and 
legal settings spoke about their knowledge of adverse events, 
observation of its practice, and data collection and policy 
associated with adverse events. Additional questions focused 
on organizational roles associated with adverse events and the 
collection and use of data captured about patient experiences 
of adverse events. Prompts were used to gather further infor-
mation relating to these questions as needed. Respondents 
spoke from their own perspective and referred to both their 
own experiences and their observations of others.
Procedure
All interviews were conducted by two authors (RH, JSM) over 
the phone and audio recorded. After obtaining consent, the inter-
view schedule was used to guide discussion with participants, 
who were also given the opportunity to shape the discussion and 
develop their own narratives. Interviews lasted 30–45 minutes 
each. Identifiable features of participants were removed by 
anonymizing audiotapes and direct quotations. Audio recordings 
were securely stored and transcribed for analysis.
analysis
Transcripts were analyzed thematically using an established 
interpretive approach.20 Following initial basic thematic cod-
ing for themes and content, the authors extracted data relating 
to OD from the main data set. These data were then further 
analyzed for themes relating to the following questions:
•	 What does the respondent understand by the term OD?
•	 To what extent does the respondent believe that current 
OD practices reflect the NSW Health OD policy?
•	 What were the respondent perceptions of structural or ser-
vice-related impediments to OD policy implementation?
NVivo 8 text management software (QSR International, 
Melbourne, VIC, Australia) was used to mark specific pieces 
of interview data that were identified as corresponding to the 
thematic index codes. More generally, NVivo 8 was also used 
to help organize the data to facilitate further analytic consid-
eration and interpretation. Data were categorized according to 
research questions and discussions formed around the main 
themes that arose from the data.
Results
Knowledge of OD
While most respondents were aware of OD policies, the 
results identified varied understandings about OD and, 
despite their roles and responsibilities, few could explain the 
institutions and/or government policies on OD. Respondents 
demonstrating a higher level of understanding of the opera-
tionalization of OD policies and processes worked in medi-
cal defense organizations. Respondents identified clinicians 
treating patients as having least understanding of the policy.
Respondents reported that staff working on the clinical 
front line had a basic understanding of OD but lacked in-depth 
knowledge about conducting an OD process or of the policy 
context. One respondent’s comment of staff was “They’re 
all aware of OD. They may not be aware of the policy, or the 
content, but they’re certainly aware…” of the necessity of OD 
(C4). They also said that staff, even if aware of the policy, had 
little “understanding how to use it…” (C4). Respondents stated 
that OD education was offered to staff in hospitals (C6, C8, 
C4) and medical defense organizations offered training to their 
members (P1). However, training was not universally accessed 
(C8), and another commented that it was sporadic (C2).
OD in practice
Only two respondents gave examples consistent with 
accepted OD practices (C4, C7). Respondent accounts 
described implementation of OD being incorrectly done and 
not in accordance with specific processes mandated within 
the NSW OD policy (articulated in Box 2) (C4, C6, C8). Two 
consistent deviations from the OD policy were noted. First, 
the person/s leading the OD was often the most senior staff 
member rather than the health professionals involved as part 
of a multidisciplinary team (C8). In other accounts (C4), it 
was the nurse or administrative staff at arm’s length to the 
adverse event rather than clinicians who had been directly 
involved in the event who conducted OD.
Second, the timing of OD lacked clarity in relation to 
when a root cause analysis (RCA) was to occur. The undertak-
ing of an RCA was often discussed as running alongside an 
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OD, such that the timing and content of OD were informed 
by the stage of and knowledge produced through an RCA 
process. Although an RCA aims to ascertain the multiple 
underlying factors that contribute to an adverse event it was 
conceptualized as a separate process, but one that was seen 
to inform the OD process. A second OD process following 
RCA was noted by multiple respondents (C3, C5, C2). One 
respondent said an “informal” OD would occur within 24 
hours of an event, but the “formal OD” would only occur after 
the completion of an RCA (C3). The respondents indicated 
that a “formal OD” (C2, C3, C5) often referred to a post-
RCA meeting between staff and patients/family members. A 
third final area in which views regarding OD appeared incon-
sistent was in the disclosure of less serious events, defined 
by the degree and duration of patient harm associated with 
an event. The current policy defines higher and lower level 
response pathways, which reflect the different OD processes 
that respondents reported using for serious and less serious 
events (C8). The approach to low-level disclosures was 
poorly defined and appeared subject to substantial variation. 
For example, one respondent identified the use of the formal 
approach for events that were lower level (C6) where another 
described a more informal bedside discussion, reflecting the 
difficulty of deciding on the severity of an incident (C8).
impediments to OD
These uncertainties about how to realize OD also impacted 
on how interviewees felt about identifying OD team members 
and identifying an appropriate time for OD. One respondent 
commented that applying OD in line with the policy is 
more difficult when harm was not immediately recognized. 
A respondent described the difficulty of getting the team 
together for an OD after a patient had been discharged and 
several days later committed suicide. Further challenges 
included the reluctance of some clinicians to be involved as 
they did not accept the suicide was caused by their actions as 
the act was “seemingly” separate from their health care (C7).
The types of events disclosed and the timing of OD were 
discussed in the context of inadequate or unsuitable training 
with several respondents saying OD was a “difficult” pro-
cess (P2, P4, C6) noting that practitioners were not trained 
in or comfortable with disclosing. Some practitioners were 
seen to be naturally just “better than others” at undertaking 
OD discussions (P1). Respondents discussed how practitio-
ners would benefit from training in communication skills, 
including how to have “difficult conversations” (P1, C6). 
Written OD guidelines were viewed as a poor substitute 
for well-developed interpersonal skills (C6). One medical 
defense organization respondent described the need for a 
“fact sheet” for doctors explaining “how to say sorry” (P1). 
Another mentioned the need for staff to be taught how to 
apologize properly (C6).
Lack of alignment between training and the requirements 
of OD and concern about legal ramifications of adverse event 
disclosure constrained the implementation of OD. Myths 
about the legal ramifications of apology were highlighted 
(P1, P4, C5). The medical defense organization respondents 
reported that doctors regularly contacted them in order to 
receive legal advice about the OD process (P2, P1): “Some 
of them are worried about compromising their insurance 
position – almost seeking permission from us to say sorry or 
apologize, because they worry if they go in and say too much 
then that might cause a problem with their insurance” (P1).
Views about inadequate policy implementation and avail-
able support for health professionals involved in adverse events 
also had an impact on the quality of OD. Respondents reported 
that clinicians were being exposed to negative professional and 
personal outcomes through OD, and needed extra support to 
enable them to conduct OD (P1, C2, C4). One facility employed 
“OD coordinators” who joined in on OD meetings to ensure OD 
compliance with local OD policy and support clinicians (C3).
Patients’ lack of knowledge about the existence of, or the 
need for, OD was a final impediment. One respondent stated 
that a request to conduct OD was frequently not accepted by 
patients (in up to 50% of cases), often because they did not 
perceive the process to be helpful and/or necessary (C8).
Discussion
Despite substantial evidence of inadequate or absent OD pro-
cesses in relation to adverse events in health care, knowledge 
of the hospital structures and policy influences contributing to 
the disclosure of adverse events is limited.16 Our data identi-
fied three key areas in which greater alignment between OD 
policy and the wider service and policy structures in NSW 
health services may enhance the implementation of OD 
practice: 1) alignment between OD and RCA processes, 2) 
holistic training that links to other relevant processes such as 
communicating bad news, risk management, and professional 
regulation and insurance, and 3) policy clarification regarding 
incidents that result in no or low-level harm. Each of these was 
identified over 10 years ago in the evaluation of the national 
OD implementation as challenges.14 Our study and interna-
tional data show that these challenges have turned into reality.
The current NSW OD policy requires that OD should 
always occur in the context of adverse events, events in which 
patients are harmed physically or psychologically. Therefore, 
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OD should always feature if there is an incident investigation 
or an RCA. Guidelines across Australia acknowledge the 
interrelationship between RCA and OD processes which 
can both contribute to analyzing causes of harm and taking 
steps to strengthen the system.20 Less clear is the optimal 
approach for undertaking OD in the context of an incident 
investigation. Our data suggest that this lack of clarity con-
cerning the interplay between the two processes may lead to 
delayed OD while the facts of the incident are investigated. 
Policy clarification specifying the requirement for a pre-
liminary OD discussion and the nature of its content may be 
of value. This issue was identified in the evaluation of the 
national OD implementation in Australia as requiring greater 
integration between RCA and OD, with OD informing RCA 
investigation processes as the minimum requirement. Some 
progress has been made toward this integration; for example, 
in Queensland, affected service users are involved in RCA 
investigations and there are similar examples in the USA.21
Policy clarification is also required regarding incidents 
that result in no or low-level harm. Data collected from the 
present sample reflect growing evidence from health profes-
sionals internationally highlighting confusion regarding the 
need for and nature of OD in instances of no or low-level 
harm.4 Determining the severity of an event and related need 
for disclosure has been discussed in the US context. A number 
of approaches have been identified to assist health profession-
als to manage the uncertainties around when disclosure is 
required. Approaches to guide judgements regarding the need 
for disclosure include the need to establish whether patients/
families expect an explanation for aspects of care that they have 
questions about; exploring whether aspects of care that clini-
cians have questions about are ones that patients/families have 
questions about; and being prepared to be open about these 
questions and their possible answers with patients/families 
who want to know.22 The Australian national policy guidance 
outlines a higher or lower level response determined by fac-
tors such as degree of patient harm and the duration of this 
but provides little guidance regarding the approach taken in 
lower level events.11 As such, our data identified diverse views 
regarding when to share information with patients and what 
information should be shared. Given that health professionals 
cite fears of litigation, reputational loss, loss of patient trust 
in the system, and blame as reasons for not practicing OD for 
non-harmful events, work is needed to promote principles of 
openness and honesty throughout health care through a culture 
in which health professionals experience psychological safety.4
In our data and elsewhere, OD appears to be conceptualized 
as a process relating to quality within the incident management 
process rather than as part of a wider movement toward patient-
centered care, with a distinct training package and program of 
work.23,24 Patient-centered communication and professionalism 
training that links to training about communicating bad news, 
risk management, professional regulation, and insurance may 
assist health professionals to determine for themselves what 
to disclose, when to bring this into the conversation, and how 
to do so appropriately. In 2008, Iedema et al described OD 
as “a dynamic and complex process that cannot be fully pro-
ceduralised, staff need to apply professional, organizational 
and ethical judgments when determining which events to dis-
close”.17 Our findings suggest that this aspect of OD remains 
the key challenge, one which may be best addressed by both 
policy clarification and better integration of OD within other 
professional skills development.
While the mantra “do no harm” and the ethical obligation 
to be honest with patients are embedded in medical ethics, 
they alone have not been sufficiently robust to ensure patients 
are informed of adverse events. The complexity of health care 
today inherently changes the nature of the doctor–patient 
relationship with the consequence that it is not always easy to 
put patient interests first, even for clinicians with the best of 
intentions.23 More is required than dependence on the moral 
responsibilities of individual clinicians. OD principles do not 
replace these ethical tenets. Rather, they provide a framework 
to guide health professionals through a process that respects 
a patient’s right to know. Policies describing disclosure of 
adverse events have roots in patient safety, not ethical theories 
or philosophy. Patient safety is not just about an outcome of 
care; it also entails a set of patient-centered competencies 
designed to minimize harm and improve quality of care.
The study is likely to be useful for international audiences to 
consider when exploring the challenges of implementing local 
incident disclosure policies. While local, state, and national 
policies vary, OD policies internationally operate on the same 
fundamental principles. A central issue for many operationaliz-
ing these policies is how disclosure policies interplay with RCA 
processes when being undertaken in the context of an RCA. In 
contrast to RCA processes, training and development regarding 
OD skill and knowledge is not positioned as a distinct program 
and this varies from one context to another. For example, in 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital in the USA, OD education and 
training is positioned with the Center for Professionalism and 
Peer Support.24 Further work to explore the implications of this 
integration with other professional skills would be valuable to 
understand the implications for OD practice.
This study is limited by its geographical restriction to only 
NSW, Australia. However, in NSW all states and territories 
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in Australia operate under the same national standards. Key 
informant interviews were used to provide a range of perspec-
tives from those who would have in-depth understanding and 
experience of the operationalization of OD throughout the 
health sector. The approach reflects that of similar studies in 
the health care sector that explore a particular policy or issue.25 
We did not seek to achieve information saturation here because 
we were exploring common challenges and obstacles in the 
operationalization of OD, which may occur in many forms 
and do not align with the concept of saturation. It is, however, 
possible that undertaking further interviews would offer new 
perspectives not presented by the key informants here.
Conclusion
Evidence from this study indicates that formal OD processes 
are not routinely applied after adverse events in NSW, despite 
clear guidelines for OD. The reasons for this are unclear 
as the service and structure that support or hinder OD are 
understudied. This knowledge is critical to addressing the 
policy-practice gap. Our paper provides insights regarding 
the influence of current service and policy structures on the 
delivery of OD and how policy clarification may contribute 
to addressing some of the challenges for implementing OD 
policy. Key areas for policy clarification relate to the inter-
play between the OD and related approaches such as RCA 
of safety events and the provision of patient-centered care.
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